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A recent example of an appropriate lesser-included offense
instruction in Virginia is Moats v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 244
(Va. App. 1991). In Moats, the appellant held a store clerk at
gunpoint, demanded money, and shot and killed the victim. Moats
was indicted for capital murder but convicted for first degree murder
under an instruction for that lesser-included offense. Moats claimed
that the evidence did not support the first degree murder instruction.
However, the jury could have found that Moats fired without premeditation, perhaps as a fearful response to an action of the store
clerk. The court thus correctly found that the instruction on first
degree murder (here, felony-murder) was supported by the evidence
and properly given. Id. While unpremeditated felony murder is not

capital murder in Virginia, evidence in a particular case may suggest
it as a lesser-included offense of capital murder.
Attorneys should continue to request lesser-included offense
instructions for first degree murder, second degree murder and the
underlying felony when the evidence supports such instructions.
When appropriate, attorneys should request an instruction requiring a
determination on the underlying felony before the jury proceeds to the
capital murder charge.
Summary and analysis by:
G. Douglas Kilday

PAYNE v. TENNESSEE
111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS

ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA

Payne was charged and convicted of the first-degree murders of
Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old daughter. He was also
convicted of the first-degree assault with intent to murder Christopher's
son, Nicholas, who was three years old at the time of the crimes and present
during the murders of his mother and sister. At the penalty stage of the
trial, the State called Nicholas' grandmother to testify as to the effect the
murders had had on the surviving child. During closing arguments, the
prosecutor also commented on the effects Nicholas had suffered from
witnessing the murders as well as the effects of the loss of his mother and
sister. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed Payne's conviction and
sentence, thereby rejecting his argument that the grandmother's and
prosecutor's statements violated his eighth amendment rights set forth in
Booth v. Maryland,482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolinav. Gathers,
490 U.S. 805 (1989). See case summary of South Carolina v. Gathers,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1991). The Tennessee Supreme
Court held that, although the grandmother's testimony was "technically
irrelevant," it "did not create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty and was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 11l S. Ct. 2597, 2604 (1991).

Booth and Gathers,the Payne Court reasoned, were based on two
premises: that the "blameworthiness" of a defendant is not generally
reflected by evidence of harm suffered by a victim of the crime, and that
only evidence showing "blameworthiness" is relevant to the decision of
whether or not to impose the death penalty. Thus Booth held that victim
impact statements could only be used as evidence if the statement directly
related to the circumstances of the crime or the character ofthe individual
defendant. 482 U.S. at 508. If victim impact statements do not relate
directly to the circumstances ofthe crime or the character of the defendant,
they create a risk that capital punishment will be imposed arbitrarily.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 505. Gathersextended the Booth rule to prosecutors'
penalty phase statements regarding victims.
Yet Justice Rehnquist reasoned that victim impact evidence is
"designed to show each victim's 'uniqueness as an individual human
being."' 111 S.Ct. at 2607 (emphasis in original). Victim impact evidence, Rehnquist argued, balances the proceedings by counteracting the
mitigating evidence that the defendant is allowed to present at the penalty
phase; in fact, Rehnquist argued that victim impact evidence may be
"necessary to determine the proper punishment for a first-degree murder." Id. at2608 (emphasis added). Rehnquist noted that the 1987 Federal
Sentencing Guidelines use factors that relate to both subjective guilt and
the harm caused by the defendant's crime. He also noted today's politically active victims' rights groups.
One theme inJustice Souter's concurring opinion is arguably consistent with Booth and Gathers:both of those cases required that evidence of
aggravating circumstances be relevant to the increased culpability of the
defendant. Souter argued first that "murder has foreseeable consequences. When it happens, it is always to distinct individuals, and after it
happens other victims are left behind." Id. at 2615. The fact that the
defendant did not know details of the victim's, or the victim's survivors',
lives should not obscure the fact that murder has foreseeable consequences, Souter reasoned.
Souter's second argument was that victim impact-type evidence is
heard at the guilt phase of the trial and "will be in the jurors' minds at the
sentencing stage." Id. at 2617. He failed to mention, however, that the
elements of the crime define what evidence is relevant at the guilt phase
of a trial. At the penalty phase, other evidence is relevant.
In ruling on what the eighth amendment requires, Payne,as a matter
of Federal and Constitutional law, now allows victim impact evidence and
argument at the penalty stage of a capital trial. The Court left it up to the

HOLDING
The Supreme Court overruled both Booth and Gathers,holding that
the eighth amendment does not bar the admission of victim impact
evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Although a defendant
may offer any mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase, Woodson v.
North Carolina,428 U.S. 280, 304, (1976) (holding that capital defendants must be afforded individualized due process), the Payne Court
reasoned that a defendant is not entitled to "that consideration wholly apart
from the crime which he committed." 111 S. Ct. at 2607. Woodson, the
Court noted, did not hold that a State may not offer evidence pertaining to
the life of the victim, the loss to the victim's family and/or the loss to
society, Woodson merely held that the defense may offer, with virtually
no limits, evidence about the defendant's own circumstances. TheBooth
decision, holding that a State may not introduce victim impact evidence,
the Court noted, unfairly weighted the process in favor of the defendant.
The Court also held, contrary to Gathers,that prosecutors may argue
victim impact to the sentencing jury. The Court stated that the decision of
whether to allow victim impact evidence is to be left to the individual
states.
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states todecidewhethervictim impactevidenceisrelevanttothesentencer's
decision whether or not to impose the death penalty.
Virginia case and statutory law still prohibit this type ofevidence. In
Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (Va. 1929), the
supreme court held that sympathy for the victims of crime "in no way
assists in determining either the guilt or innocence of the accused." 149
S.E. at 415. Likewise, Virginia's two statutory aggravating factors -

vileness and future dangerousness - which define relevance of the
Commonwealth's evidence at the penalty trial relate only to the personal
blameworthiness of the defendant in accord with Booth and Gathers.
Therefore, to date the Payne rule is not the law of Virginia.
Summary and analysis by:
Wendy Freeman Miles

STAMPER v. MUNCIE
944 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1991)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit

FACTS
In 1978, Charles Sylvester Stamper was tried and convicted on
three counts of felony murder and four associated felony counts in
Henrico County, Virginia. The appeals process has consistently
affirmed Stamper's trial court death sentence.
Stamper was a cook at Shoney's Restaurant where three employees were found shot to death at close range during the course of a
robbery from the restaurant safe. A great deal of circumstantial
evidence tied Stamper to the scene. A car resembling his was spotted
at the time of the murders in the vicinity of the crime; the glass door
to the restaurant was broken from the inside, out; glass particles were
found on the floor of the defendant's car, 20% of which matched in
optical properties the glass of the door; a set of keys of one of the
murder victims was found near the home of Stamper's parents; a gun
found near the home of Stamper's parents was the same type as that
used to kill the victims and the bullets which had been shot from that
gun were of the same type as those found in the victims; Stamper paid
off a good deal of indebtedness within two days of the crime.
Stamper's case was remanded twice by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit for failure to exhaust state remedies and a full
decade after his trial, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the
U.S. District Court. The petition was denied.
HOLDING
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of relief.
Stamper assigned three general counts of error which were all rejected. The court summarily dismissed as a matter of law Stamper's
first assertion that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt because of its circumstantial nature. Second, the court found no clear error concerning
Stamper's position that he had ineffective assistance of counsel
during voir dire. Finally, the court found no error regarding the
judge's response to a juror's question posed to the court.
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Stamper raised a number of issues and grounds for relief. Some
of these the court treated in a summary fashion, did not involve capital
penalty law, or revolved around facts peculiar to the case and are
unlikely to arise often. These items are not discussed here.
A. Circumstantial Evidence Standard
While it is well established that circumstantial evidence may be
used as probative and meaningful in a criminal case, the law in

Virginia seems to require that a trier of fact relying on circumstantial
evidence must, in fact, exclude every other reasonable possibility
except guilt. This rule was promulgated by the Virginia Supreme
Court which held that circumstantial evidence may be used in a
criminal case "provided it is of such convincing character as to
exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the accused is
guilty." Dukes v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 313 S.E.2d 382
(1984) (emphasis in original). Attesting to this standard, the Virginia
Court of Appeals has held that "[w]here the evidence is wholly
circumstantial, a conviction can be obtained only if the evidence is
consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence, and excludes
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Beck v. Commonwealth,
2 Va. App. 170, 342 S.E.2d 642 (1986).
The circuit court, however, may have applied a different standard
in Stamper than the one handed down in the foregoing cases. The
Fourth Circuit held that the prosecution is not constitutionally required to negate every hypothesis except that of guilt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Interestingly, the court cited no
Virginia law to substantiate this conclusion. It pointed out that the
Tenth Circuit has ruled that "circumstantial evidence need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not
negate all possibilities save guilt." UnitedStatesv. Gay, 774 F.2d 368,
373 (10th Cir. 1985). The court also relied upon Fifth Circuit and
Seventh Circuit opinions to support its position. Based on those
holdings, the circuit court in Stamplerfound that a rational trier of fact
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
because the evidence sufficiently supported such inferences.
Stamper argued that, given the facts in his case, no rational trier
of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt or conclude that he
was the trigger man. A Jackson analysis may allow a court to make
such a finding, but the Virginia rules may not. The Fourth Circuit's
dismissal of Stamper's contention based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jackson and the other circuit courts'
holdings may be a misapplication of the law given the Virginia rules
promulgated in Dukes and Beck.
The question is whether a conclusion that a rational trier of fact
could find guilt is the complete equivalent of excluding every reasonable hypothesis except guilt. If it is true, under Jackson, that federal
due process as a general proposition might not require exclusion of
every hypothesis of innocence beyond a reasonable doubt as Virginia
state cases do require, a separate violation of due process may occur
through the arbitrary administration of state created rights. This is the
result if the Fourth Circuit failed to apply a Virginia evidentiary
standard which is more liberal than that applied by the United States
Supreme Court. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see
Konrad, FederalDue ProcessandVirginia'sArbitraryAbrogationof
CapitalDefendant's State Created Rights, Capital Defense Digest,

